Derek Parfit, a renowned British philosopher, explored the concept of tele-transportation as a thought experiment in his work Reasons and Persons. The tele-transportation scenario raises critical questions about personal identity, continuity of the self, and what it means to be the same person over time. The basic idea involves a futuristic device that disassembles a person's body at one location and reassembles it at another. The reconstructed person has all the memories, thoughts, and characteristics of the original, leading to the fundamental philosophical inquiry: is the person at the new location the same as the original?
Parfit's experiment challenges traditional views of identity. According to many, personal identity is tied to the continuity of our physical body or soul. However, in tele-transportation, there is a clear disruption: the body is destroyed and then recreated, atom by atom, elsewhere. While the new individual may feel and act exactly like the original, the process raises the question of whether the original person has died, leaving only a perfect replica. Parfit argued that this model shows how personal identity might not be as fundamental as we think, suggesting that identity is not preserved through physical continuity alone.
Parfit posited that identity is not what matters for survival. Instead, psychological continuity and connectedness—memory, consciousness, and personality—are more important. In tele-transportation, the newly reassembled person retains all psychological characteristics of the original. To Parfit, this continuity of psychological experience is what makes the person feel like the same individual, even though the original body is destroyed. This leads to the conclusion that identity itself might be a less important concept when it comes to survival and selfhood, as long as psychological continuity remains intact.
Moreover, Parfit’s thought experiment also brings up questions about the nature of "self". If one were to survive tele-transportation but in multiple copies, each with the same memories and characteristics, which one would be the true continuation of the original person? This multiplicity problem, in Parfit’s view, further weakens the idea of personal identity as an absolute, fixed entity. If more than one version of the same person can exist, then the notion of a single, continuous self is undermined.
Ultimately, through tele-transportation, Parfit argued that personal identity is not as essential to survival as we might think. What truly matters is psychological continuity, even if the person who exists after the teleportation is not, in a strict sense, the "same" as the original. This challenges deeply ingrained intuitions about selfhood, suggesting that we should rethink how we define the self and what it means to persist through time. For Parfit, understanding that identity is not what matters can lead to a more flexible, less ego-centric view of our existence.